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455 
Back to the Future 
James Nisbet* 
 
Reading Jessica Silbey’s Justifying Copyright in the Age of Digital Production from 
my position as a scholar of modern and contemporary art history is an uncanny 
experience that stems from multiple aspects of the argument. First, despite the 
impressive training, years of specialized practice, and professional success among 
the commercial and studio photographers whom she interviewed, these by and large 
are not the group of photographic practitioners addressed by either contemporary 
art criticism or art historical scholarship. Since the advent of Marcel Duchamp’s 
readymade in the early twentieth century and the traction gained by a conceptualist 
approach to artistic production following the 1960s that has privileged the ideation 
of artworks over manual skill, the kind of photographic production most important 
to contemporary art criticism and history eschews precisely the kind of abilities 
valued by the majority of photographers discussed in Silbey’s article. In other words, 
the body of work produced by these photographers does not exist entirely outside 
the mainstream of the art world, but is decidedly on its fringes. 
Second, from the personal point of view of a scholar in the humanities today, 
there is sense of being thrust into conversations of the late twentieth century, rather 
than the twenty-first, in Silbey’s argument. I completed my own doctoral studies at 
a time during which the humanities at large had transitioned from the hot-house  
of theory associated with late twentieth-century postmodernism and the  
American reception of critical theory to a more decidedly historiographic and 
epistemologically grounded approach. Thus, it is intriguing that the issues of 
reproducibility and narrative theory cited by Silbey—comprising notable authors 
such as Walter Benjamin and Hayden White—arise primarily from that previous 
period and paradigm. This, however, is not unique to her contribution to “The 
Discursive Turn in Copyright” conference. From reader-response theory to Jacques 
Derrida’s aesthetic theory to Mikhail Bakhtin’s poetics, the core thinkers and ideas 
cited in a number of the papers delivered at the conference (now revised and 
collected in the present volume) offer something like a time warp for scholars in the 
humanities, taking us back to debates staged largely in the 1980s and 1990s. 
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Third, Silbey’s contribution is also striking for its placing into dialogue two 
notably different methods of argument: the one developed through historically 
established case law of the United States Supreme Court, and the other collected 
through conversation with living subjects. The first kind of knowledge is textual in 
orientation and its influence established by the institutional weight of the hierarchy 
of courts within U.S. law. This first is thus a vertically streamlined approach to 
interpretation characteristic of legal “precedent” in the most basic sense of the term. 
The second kind of knowledge has become textual only through Silbey’s 
transcription of live conversations conducted through a more ethnographic 
approach. This second kind of knowledge is, in turn, more horizontally distributed 
in nature, seeking opinions and personal reflections among individuals who inhabit 
a shared field of practice characterized by similar institutional and technological 
possibilities and constraints. 
Earlier, I had called these various strains of Silbey’s argument “uncanny,” 
which I mean only in a loosely Freudian sense, not as the return of the repressed so 
much as an eerie double to appear before the art historian reading her text. As I 
have outlined, while relatively little of commercial photography, postmodern 
methodologies, case law, or ethnography are major topics across the history of art 
in its present configuration, what is familiar are the overlapping and myriad 
temporalities brought forth by these aspects of Silbey’s argument. Rather than being 
out of time or out of sync with the current practices of my own discipline, the 
multiplicity of timespans to arise throughout Silbey’s argument align with a number 
of recent and influential art historical publications that attempt to theorize such 
folds of time as a methodology. 
Many of these studies have been undertaken in the fields of early modern and 
pre-modern European art. Alexander Nagel and Christopher S. Wood make a case 
in Anachronic Renaissance for what they call the “plural temporality” of artworks, 
which in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in European culture, meant a 
competing or even recursive tension between one model of art’s temporality as a 
timeless substitution for divine creation and another, more thoroughly presentist 
view of creation as the original act of an artist.1 Amy Knight Powell’s Scenes from the 
Late Medieval Church and the Modern Museum stages comparisons of Northern 
Renaissance artworks with those of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries 
according to an interpretive premise that 
form has a way of detaching works of art from the people who worked 
them and from the time and place in which they were made, not by 
transcending history—that would be the metaphysical understanding of 
form as “idea” or “essence”—but rather by transgressing history, at least, 
our linear conception of it.2 
 
1. ALEXANDER NAGEL & CHRISTOPHER S. WOOD, ANACHRONIC RENAISSANCE 7, 16–17 
(2010). 
2. AMY KNIGHT POWELL, SCENES FROM THE LATE MEDIEVAL CHURCH AND THE MODERN 
MUSEUM 9, 11 (2012). 
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Roland Betancourt takes up a related approach to what Powell calls the 
“promiscuity” of visual form in his forthcoming study titled The Proleptic Image, with 
the important revision that the bending of history imagined by what Betancourt 
terms “collisions” between different objects from different periods of time is not 
oriented toward imaginaries or institutional frameworks of the present day. Such 
collisions instead might take place between artworks of any temporal formation 
with those of another, with the result being a further unraveling of the unidirectional 
assumptions of linear time.3 An additional strain of this recent art historical theory 
has further sought to characterize the condition of “contemporaneity” as existing 
among multiple trajectories of time across the globe. Such studies seek to 
characterize the simultaneity of forms of cultural production arising from discrepant 
relations to advanced industrialization, digital automation, and the postcolonial 
economics of globalization.4 
In light of this body of scholarship, we might return to the three art historically 
uncanny aspects of Silbey’s article: commercial photography, theoretical 
postmodernism, and the dialogue of case law and ethnography. Regarding the 
photographers, many of their statements assume a singularity and timelessness to 
the criteria of photographic quality. Such criteria of judgment, however, exists as 
but one among many ways to value photographic production that might also 
encompass camera-less photographs that manipulate the chemical basis of 
photography, conceptualist approaches noted previously that devalue conventional 
photographic skill, or even more recent images made entirely using digital data that 
are printed on photographic paper, rather than using light “captured” by either 
analog or digital photographic technologies. This is to say that the criteria invoked 
by Silbey’s commercial photographers is relative. But even beyond this point, such 
a set of criteria was itself copied from another field of practice in the nineteenth 
century, following the invention of photography. 
At the moment when new technologies arise, after all, their initial uses tend to 
adhere to pre-existing frameworks. In our lifetime, we might think of the digitization 
of music on CDs, a shiny plastic version of vinyl records, before the arrival of the 
iPod. In the history of photography, nineteenth-century practitioners such as 
Napolean Sarony, Henry Peach Robinson, and Oscar Rejlander initially used 
cameras to compose portraits that borrowed from the paradigm of the painter’s 
 
3. Roland Betancourt, The Proleptic Image (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
4. See KEITH MOXEY, VISUAL TIME: THE IMAGE IN HISTORY (2013); Hal Foster et  
al., Questionnaire on “The Contemporary,” 130 OCTOBER 3 (2009). It should further be noted that outside 
of Anglo-American Art History, the work of Georges Didi-Huberman has been especially fundamental 
in establishing more experimental notions of anachronism. See GEORGES DIDI-HUBERMAN, DEVANT 
LE TEMPS: HISTOIRE DE L’ART ET ANACHROMISME DES IMAGES (2000); GEORGES DIDI-
HUBERMAN, L’IMAGE SURVIVANTE: HISTOIRE DE L’ART ET TEMPS DES EANTÔMES SELON ABY 
WARBURG (2002); GEORGES DIDI-HUBERMAN, CONFRONTING IMAGES: QUESTIONING THE ENDS 
OF A CERTAIN HISTORY OF ART ( John Goodman trans., 2005); Georges Didi-Huberman, Before the 
Image, Before Time: The Sovereignty of Anachromism, in COMPELLING VISUALITY: THE WORK OF ART 
IN AND OUT OF HISTORY 31 (Claire J. Farago & Robert Zwijnenberg eds., 2003). 
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studio—oil paint on canvas or panel being the recording technology of naturalistic 
depiction that had predominated in the centuries immediately prior to that of 
photography. Regarding the contemporary commercial photographers interviewed 
by Silbey, many of whom express concern about a loss of income under the market 
pressures of new digital practices and articulate the necessity of maintaining their 
studios and preferred way of making photographs, one might wonder whether the 
disappearance of such artistic capital has been looming far before the advent of 
digital photography. To follow this line of thought, the protection of pre-shutter 
labor activities under copyright law might be seen to have shielded an already 
obsolete institutional practice. 
To draw a comparison, we might think of this present situation as akin to 
protecting the labor of plaster preparers in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to 
maintain the business of fresco painting, with those practitioners arguing that a 
labor force of oil painters producing artworks both more portable and less time-
consuming was placing at risk the very viability of quality painting (understood as 
meaning: fresco painting). That commercial photographers now claim a similar line 
of thought with respect to the emergence of a labor force working with quicker and 
more distributable digital techniques, or that unlicensed copies of their work 
repurposed on digital platforms threaten the viability of quality photography 
(understood as meaning: made via the conventions of studio photography), fails to 
register the folding of time between these claims and technological innovations of 
the art historical past. In this instance, the problems raised by the advent of digital 
photography are not new problems, per se, but rather the recurrence of ongoing 
and cyclical issues encountered when technological innovation intersects with 
representational convention. 
In similar fashion, the generational gap—or seeming “time warp,” as I call it 
above—between postmodernism’s moment in the humanities and the present day 
does not leave the importance of its arguments in the past. One of the shared 
insights within the art historical body of literature on myriad temporalities is the 
idea that no object or text is ever truly out of time or without impact in the time of 
another object or text. While the law must remain oriented to the present—as new 
situations, claims, complaints, and cases demand just evaluation under its 
jurisdiction—it too has a folded relation to the past. As Silbey convincingly 
demonstrates, the differing issues among Burrows-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,5 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co.,6 and Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service, Co.7 all nonetheless adhere to present-day concerns, not in a straight line of 
development, but more through loops and returns to understandings of creativity 
and originality to have arisen since the late nineteenth century. The fact that legal 
theory would also incorporate humanist discourses of the 1990s appears consistent 
 
5. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
6. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
7. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
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with its inclination to revisit disputes of the 1880s or 1900s to address the changing 
face of copyright adjudication in the present day. 
The final issue—that counterpoising the interpretive approaches of Supreme 
Court case law with that of interviewing individual subjects—is equally resonant for 
thinking about the concerns shared between the fields of law and the humanities, 
in that it foregrounds the very issue of how different temporal paradigms of data 
and interpretation can and should be juxtaposed against one another. For the 
outside observer, the practice of the law in the court system of the United States 
seems to conflate historical and ahistorical assumptions: the historical being the 
precedent of established case law ranging over the two-hundred-plus-year history 
of the United States as a sovereign nation, and the ahistorical being a reliance on 
deductive logic and rationality that exists outside of the ideological conditions of 
the individual performing said reasoning. The strength of Silbey’s paper for such 
readers strikes me as lying precisely at this intersection, in staging a conscious 
dialogue between historical time and present time, that is, of temporal vantages that 
otherwise unconsciously underlie legal argument. This is a different set of issues and 
perspectives than those historians of art tend to use in addressing the subject of 
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